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3 also said that it was not deciding whether the exemption approach would, in fact, satisfy RFRA's requirements. 8 Soon after, the Court granted emergency relief to Wheaton College, which argued, as have numerous other religious institutions, that even filing the form certifying its status as a religious nonprofit and its objection to providing contraceptive services "'makes it complicit in grave moral evil" by "triggering the obligation for someone else to provide the services to which it objects." Wheaton College argued this substantially burdened its free exercise of religion under RFRA. 9 Reading the tea leaves, Justice Sotomayor (joined by the other two female members of the Court) strenuously argued that granting Wheaton College that relief "does not square with the Court's reasoning in Hobby Lobby;" further, Wheaton College's substantial burden claim did not meet the "indisputably clear" standard for relief. 10 Numerous challenges by religious nonprofit organizations to ACA's accommodation provisions as not accommodating enough continue to wend their way through the federal courts. 11 At this writing, three federal circuits have rejected these challenges, and the Supreme Court may eventually weigh in on the issue. 12 Moreover, although the Hobby Lobby majority emphasized that the forMardel. Unless discussing facts specific to one corporation, this essay will refer to the three corporate plaintiffs as "Hobby Lobby" to avoid cumbersome references in text. 8 Ibid. at 2782. 9 Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2812 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan).
10 Ibid. at 2808-2809, 2813. to "ethical independence," which limits the reasons government may restrict freedom. It "must never restrict freedom just because it assumes that one way for people to live their lives . . . is intrinsically better than another" or assume "that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in truth or virtue." (RwG, 130, 134) Ethical independence also protects "religious conviction" by "outlawing" a constraint that is neutral on its face, but "whose design covertly assumes some direct or indirect subordination." (RwG, 134) Such independence, however, does not bar government from "interfering with people's chosen ways of life" for other reasons, such as protecting other people from harm, protecting "natural wonders," or the general welfare.
(RwG, 130-131) people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect;" for example, it may not distribute "goods or opportunities' or "constrain liberty" on the ground either that some citizens are "more worthy of concern" or that "one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to another's." 20 Dworkin's subsequent work developed this conception political morality around principles of dignity and responsibility.
Immediately following Religion Without God's discussion of the obligation to obey general, nondiscriminatory laws that show "equal concern," Dworkin provides a brief hint of how his framework might address the explosion of seeming conflicts between religious liberty and other rights and the question of exemptions. Government, he says, must "notice whether any group regards the activity it proposes to prohibit or burden as a sacred duty," and if so, "must consider whether equal concern for that group requires an exemption or other amelioration," if giving one can be done "with no significant damage to the policy in play. FDA-approved contraceptive methods that they believed "may operate after the fertilization of an egg." 31 The female employees of these companies were not official parties in the case; their interests would be affected by the lawsuit's outcome, and so many briefs addressed those interests. In canvassing these briefs, I bear in mind Dworkin's proposed shift from a special right to religion to a general right to ethical independence.
Ethical independence, as explained earlier, requires that government not favor a specific way of life, including the religious beliefs of one group. The shift from a special right to religious freedom to a more general right to ethical independence also levels the playing field. As applied to this conflict, female employees who wish to use certain forms of contraception may be exercising their ethical independence, just as their corporate employers who object to providing such contraceptives do so out of an ethical belief that such contraceptive methods are tantamount to abortion. Protecting ethical independence requires that government leave individual citizens to decide their way of life for themselves, rather than restricting their freedom on the assumption that one way is " intrinsically better than another" or that "people who live that way are better This group charged that it is "demeaning to women to suggest that women's fertility and their bearing and rearing of children, are 'barriers'" to women's opportunity and workplace participation.
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A second argument supporters of ACA made about corporate responsibility was that certain consequences flow from the decision by religiously-motivated, for-profit corporations to participate in the market and commercial activity, including compliance with laws like ACA.
Some briefs framed this in terms of the collision between employer conscience and employee- successful life --and found persuasive the argument that Hobby Lobby's participation in ACA made its owners complicit in immorality, his framework would support accommodation "if an exception can be managed with no significant damage to the policy in play." 74 As it turns out, the Supreme Court made precisely this assumption about accommodation in ruling for Hobby Lobby, even as it did not reach the question of whether the accommodation provision was itself a threat to religious liberty under RFRA. 
III. The Hobby Lobby

The Hobby Lobby Majority: A For Profit Corporation Has Free Exercise Rights
To begin with the conclusion: a five-member majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, holds that ACA's requirement that "three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies owners" violates RFRA, "which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest." 77 For purposes of its analysis, the Court assumes (while expressing some doubt) that the government did have a compelling interest in guaranteeing that all women have access to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing, including the four challenged contraceptive methods. Thus, the Conestoga board adopted a "Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life," asserting that "human life begins at conception" and that it is "against [their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of life" after conception, which is a "sin against God to which they are held accountable." 82 So, too, the Greens believe life begins at conception and that "it would violate their religion to facilitate access to" the four contraceptive methods at issue since they "operate after [the] point" when life begins.
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The majority reasons, thus, that when RFRA and the First Amendment protect "the freeexercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby [and] Conestoga," they protect "the religious liberty of the humans who own and control these companies" or are " associated with a corporation in one way or another." A corporation is simply a "fiction to provide protection for human beings," a "form of organization" used by "human beings" to achieve certain ends.
Separate from the human beings who "own, run, and are employed by them," the Court sums up, The majority rejects the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit corporations, with respect to the "principle" the dissent argued undergirded protecting the religious "autonomy" of the nonprofit corporation: that such protection "often furthers individual religious freedom as well"; it contended that principle applies equally to for-profit corporations. 85 The fact that a forprofit corporation makes money does not mean it cannot have other purposes, the Court argues, pointing to how for-profit corporations support "a wide variety of charitable causes" and also
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"further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives" through choices about how to operate. Why not, then, include furthering religious values and beliefs among those other "worthy"
objectives? 86 The majority fends off HHS's argument that Congress could not have intended RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations, given the difficulty of determining the "sincere 'beliefs' of a corporation," short of "divisive, polarizing proxy battles over the religious identity of large, publicly traded corporation such as IBM or General Electric." 87 The majority states that there is no precedent of a publicly-traded corporation asserting RFRA claims, and it seems "improbable" that, in such a corporation, "unrelated shareholders -including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders -would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs." Before it, the majority stresses, were three closely held corporations, owned and controlled by members of a single family, the sincerity of whose religious beliefs was not in dispute. 88 It was precisely this mixture of stakeholders in a large public corporation that Dworkin emphasized as a reason not to recognize corporations as persons with free speech rights, since that speech would likely reflect only the views of the managers, and some in that that complex mix would "hate" the speech. 89 Dworkin might answer the majority that, while the sincere beliefs of the corporate owners of a for-profit closely held corporations were not at odds with those of their shareholders, they might well be at odds with their employees, who wish access to the contraceptives the owners find morally objectionable.
Turning briefly to the issue of burden, the majority rejects HHS's argument that the link between requiring the health insurance and the morally objectionable act -a woman employing a method of contraception that destroyed an embryo -was too attenuated to burden religious exercise. 90 The Court observes that the corporate owners' belief that HHS's rules would involve them in immorality raised a "difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy" -"the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another." 91 The majority insists that it was not the province of HHS or the Court to resolve this question or tell plaintiffs "their beliefs" about the correct answer are "flawed." Instead, the relevant point is that, given their convictions that ACA's requirements violate their beliefs and that the only alternative -providing health care consistent with their beliefs -would involve a financial penalty, there is a substantial burden on religious exercise. HHS could avoid that burden, the majority concludes, by extending to these for profit companies the same exemption it provides to nonprofit religious institutions. 92 What would Dworkin do, using an ethical independence frame, in evaluating the majority's putting to the side the "difficult" question of "religion and moral philosophy" and focusing instead on the ease of accommodating Hobby
Lobby and relieving the "substantial" burden on its free exercise? He would likely find that Congress's reasons for enacting the contraceptive mandate -ensuring women's access to preventive health care -did not violate employers' ethical independence. If he accepted the proposition that that mandate nonetheless burdened what Hobby Lobby's owners felt was a "sacred duty," then he would likely consider whether "equal concern" for them required an exemption if it could be managed "with no significant damage to the policy in play," (RwG, 136), an "if" about which Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, expresses doubt.
Dignity, Self-Definition, and the For-Profit Corporation
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is striking not only for its characteristic appeal to "dignity -also a central theme in Dworkin's work -but also for its conception of the spheres in which religious persons seek to live out their religious beliefs. In Religion Without God, Dworkin challenges the idea that a particular account of divine creation (the "science" part of religion)
tells us anything about the best way to live (the "value" part of religion Religion Without God suggests accommodating religious entities would be appropriate, in certain circumstances; would that apply to Hobby Lobby? Dworkin, recall, argued that, in a case where providing an exemption would "put people at a serious risk of harm that it is the purpose of the law to avoid," refusing an exemption "does not deny equal concern." Rather, this "priority" of "nondiscriminatory collective government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and right." (RwG, (136) (137) What, then, might Dworkin make of Kennedy's argument that attempts to balance the 96 Ibid.
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interests at stake? On the one hand, Kennedy states, "among the reasons that the United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be restricted or demeaned by government for exercising his or her religion." On the other hand, "neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling." Dworkin might well support this formulation. Then Kennedy concludes that these two priorities may be "reconciled" through "the existing accommodation the Government has designed, identified, and used for circumstances closely parallel to those presented here" -the exemption process made available to not for profit religious institutions. Would Dworkin support this conclusion? If he did, would he, nonetheless, be wary of the majority's caveat that, in proffering the accommodation provision as a less restrictive alternative, it was not ruling on whether that accommodation would survive review under RFRA? The dissent advances our understanding of those, and other, issues.
Health Care Choice Must be in the Hands of Women
In a lengthy dissent joined by justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg vigorously objects to the majority's expansive reading of RFRA and its disregard of the line between profit and not for profit corporations. 98 The "startling breadth" of the majority's decision, she begins, "holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge 98 Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan did not join Part III-C-1 of Justice Ginsburg's dissent. They agreed with her that the plaintiffs' "challenge to the contraceptive coverage requirements fails on the merits," and thus, "we need not and do not decide whether either for-profit corporations or their owners may bring claims under" RFRA. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Breyer, J. and Kagan, J., dissenting). 
